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Michael A. Haskel, Esq.*
The increase in the number and importance of reciprocals or
inter-insurance exchanges has led to greater regulation of this
form of insurer, which was once largely exempt from government
oversight in many jurisdictions.1  Currently, jurisprudence varies
among the states.2  Although the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (hereinafter “NAIC”) drafted the Reciprocal Attor-
ney-in-Fact Model Act (hereinafter “Reciprocal Act”) to provide
uniformity in the treatment of reciprocals, the Reciprocal Act is
seriously flawed in the manner it treats the relative rights and du-
ties of the advisory committee and of the attorney-in-fact, which
respectively govern and administer the reciprocal.
To achieve a greater understanding of inter-insurance ex-
changes, this article will discuss: (1) the nature of reciprocal insur-
ance; (2) state regulation of reciprocals; (3) the role of
subscribers, (4) the advisory committee, and (5) the attorney-in-
fact; (6) practical aspects of the relationship between the attorney-
in-fact and the advisory committee; and (7) conflicts between the
advisory committee and the attorney in fact.  This article will also
advance general proposals to treat problems relating to
reciprocals.
NATURE OF RECIPROCAL INSURANCE
A reciprocal is an insurer organized by individuals who aggre-
gate resources to indemnify members against a defined risk.  Each
subscriber is both an insurer and an insured.3  Liability is separate
and several.4  Each member enters into a subscriber agreement,
* Michael A. Haskel, practicing New York attorney since 1976. His general areas
of practice include litigation; commercial law; insurance and real estate. Georgetown
University Law Center; New York University, J.D., 1975; Cornell University, B.S., 1970.
1 43 AM.JUR.2d Insurance § 78 (2002)
2 See, e.g., infra note 19 and accompanying text. See also Reciprocal Act Drafting
Note to §1.
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pursuant to which the subscriber separately underwrites losses, and
each is issued a separate policy of insurance.5  A pool representing
the aggregate surplus and underwriting profits of the reciprocal
stands as a fund for the payment of claims and administrative
expenses.6
At the time membership is conferred, the subscriber advances
capital surplus to the reciprocal, and an individual subscriber ac-
count is established.  This account is maintained throughout the
period of membership, reflecting both the member’s capital ad-
vance and his pro rata stake in the reciprocal’s underwriting prof-
its.  The funds representing the individual’s account are
commingled with those of other subscribers, but each subscriber’s
account is calculated separately to show the individual’s distinct eq-
uity interest.  When the member retires from the reciprocal, the
retiree receives a payment reflecting the amount shown in the indi-
vidual accounting, adjusted for gains and losses attributable to un-
derwriting, and investment performance.
The absence of a market for exchanging ownership interests
in reciprocals is one of its distinguishing features.7  However, sub-
scribers may periodically receive dividends during membership.  A
decision to pay a dividend following any given accounting interval
is governed by a number of considerations, including the existence
of free and indivisible surplus, which can loosely be defined as
profits.  As will be noted below, a subscriber may also be obligated
to pay an assessment to the reciprocal if the reciprocal’s financial
condition becomes unstable.8
Reciprocals are generally not incorporated and their status as
de jure entities vary depending upon the jurisdiction in which they
are formed.9  Thus, it has been opined that a reciprocal may sue or
be sued,10 although contrary authority holds that a reciprocal is not
a separate legal entity.11  In some states, a receiver in bankruptcy
5 Id. at § 39:48; see Long v. Sakleson, 195 A. 416, 418 (1937).
6 COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d., supra note 3, at § 39:55.
7 Although reciprocals most closely resemble mutual liability insurance compa-
nies, the two are distinguishable in many ways.  The liability of members of a mutual is
joint and several, and the equity in the mutual may be freely traded.  While a member
of a mutual may make a capital investment in the mutual, all members suffer losses
jointly.  Therefore, the member does not have a separate subscriber account although
the capital investment may be treated as a loan that must be returned. See COUCH ON
INSURANCE 3d., supra note 3, at  § 39:48.
8 See infra pp. 7-8.
9 See COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d., supra note 3,  at § 39:48.
10 E.g. Long v. Sakleson, 195 A. 416 (1937); Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v.
Bounds, 88 S.W.2d 836 (1935).
11 Turner v. Henshaw, 155 N.E. 222 (1927).
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could not be appointed for a reciprocal on the grounds that a re-
ciprocal has no distinct corporate existence.12
STATE REGULATION OF RECIPROCALS
In Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen,13 the Supreme Court held
that New York could impose restrictions under its reciprocal law
upon an out-of-state insurer.  The Court rejected the insurer’s ar-
gument that New York’s requirements made it impossible for the
insurer to operate in the state, and that the Equal Protection
Clause of the U.S. Constitution precluded treating reciprocals and
mutual liability insurance companies differently.14  It is now well
settled that statutes can impose a variety of restrictions on recipro-
cals.  In general, the regulation of insurers concerns the formation
and regulation: the insurer’s finances; the relationship between the
insurer, the insured, and those that govern the insurer; and the
relationship between the insurer and third parties, such as claim-
ants.  The nature of reciprocal insurance affects the way in which
state law is applied to each of these areas and the general require-
ments that are applicable to other types of carriers.  For example, if
a reciprocal is writing life insurance and the state prescribes the
language that must be contained in policies of life insurance, then
the reciprocal will be required to issue policies that contain the
required wording.  This article will not discuss insurance regula-
tions that have widespread applicability; instead it will concentrate
upon those government controls that exclusively operate upon the
reciprocal.
The extent of state regulation of reciprocals is largely depen-
dent upon the way in which reciprocal insurance is perceived.
Viewed as private ventures when groups of individuals join to-
gether to defend against a defined risk, the need for regulation
does not appear compelling, particularly when the coverage af-
forded is not compulsory.
The opinion that reciprocals should not suffer extensive regu-
lation is embraced by a number of states, among which is Penn-
sylvania, whose treatment of reciprocal insurance illustrates a
relaxed approach.15  By statute, reciprocals in Pennsylvania are de-
fined as “[i]ndividuals, partnerships and corporations [of Penn-
sylvania]. . .authorized to exchange reciprocal or inter-insurance
12 See COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d., supra note 3, at  § 39:48.
13 318 U.S. 313 (1943).
14 Id. at 321.
15 See 40 PA. CONS.  STAT. § 961 et. seq. (2002).
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contracts with each other, or with individuals, partnerships and
corporations of other States and countries, providing indemnity
among themselves. . .”16   Pennsylvania requires each reciprocal to
file a basic declaration of insurance.17  The statute is primarily con-
cerned with finances.  It directs that minimal reserves must be es-
tablished and maintained,18 and it requires that the reciprocal’s
fund be placed under the control of the attorney-in-fact for the
payment of losses.19 Furthermore, a minimum capital surplus of
$1.5 million must be initially established where there are at least
100 separate policies or indemnity risks.20   As in Pennsylvania, the
approach to reciprocal in Texas is largely devoted to financial con-
cerns and directs the filing of a certificate of authority, which,
among other requirements, must provide for subscriber contingent
liability equal to one year’s premium if surplus falls below a certain
level.21 Texas also requires minimum unencumbered surplus,
reserves at a minimum required level, and surplus meeting the re-
quirements set by statute.22
Because of these requirements, the financial stability, which
includes the internal organization, of the reciprocal is a factor re-
lated to the payment of claims.  Obviously, where the power to run
the reciprocal is placed in a body that is beyond the supervision of
subscribers, the possibility of investment decisions adverse to sub-
scribers is increased, as is the likelihood of defalcation.  Therefore,
state regulation of a reciprocal’s organizational aspects can be de-
fended on the basis of concern over how the reciprocal will govern
its finances.  In addition, such regulation may be based upon the
state’s right to guard against potential fraudulent activities.  In the
exercise of its police powers, the state may take steps to protect
subscribers from being compromised by an attorney-in-fact which
runs the reciprocal for its own benefit, thereby jeopardizing the
subscribers’ interests.  Taking a more paternalistic approach than
that of Pennsylvania or Texas, New York mandates that a number
of detailed contractual provisions be incorporated into subscriber
agreements or management agreements to guard against abuse of
subscribers.23  California takes a similar approach to that of New
16 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 961.
17 See generally 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 964.
18 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 964(d), 968.
19 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 964(d).
20 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 964(f).
21 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §  942.151 (Vernon 2002).
22 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §  942.155.
23 N.Y. INS. LAW §  6106(a)(1)(McKinney 2002).
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York, although the required statutory requirements of California
are set forth in more general terms, relegating the drafting of de-
tails to the initiative of the parties.  Florida has also enacted general
legislation requiring provisions to be included in subscriber agree-
ments to protect members.24
The reciprocal’s viability, both as an economic entity and as an
organization structured in a way that promotes the interests of sub-
scribers, is of particular importance when the insurer operates in
fields where coverage is mandatory.  For example, in those jurisdic-
tions where medical malpractice insurance is required of private
attending physicians practicing in a hospital setting, the state has a
particular interest in having carriers act responsibly.  The manner
in which reciprocal medical malpractice carriers are organized war-
rants greater scrutiny to assure that the mandatory policies issued
by such carriers are viable.  By enacting a separate and distinct sec-
tion to cover medical malpractice reciprocals,25 California has at-
tempted to balance the right of subscribers to enter into reciprocal
contracts of insurance and the competing interest of the state to
regulate the insurers that operate in a field of great concern to the
general public.  Other jurisdictions have recognized the special na-
ture of reciprocals by exempting reciprocals from certain insur-
ance laws, and by enacting specific regulations where the need is
perceived.  For example, in Texas, reciprocals are prohibited from
writing life insurance.26
The reciprocal’s viability, both as an economic entity and as an
organization structured in a way that promotes the interests of sub-
scribers, is particularly important when the insurer operates in
fields where coverage is mandatory. For example, in those jurisdic-
tions where medical malpractice insurance is required of private-
attending physicians practicing in a hospital setting, the state has a
particular interest in having carriers act responsibly.  The manner
in which reciprocal medical malpractice carriers are organized war-
rants greater scrutiny to assure that the mandatory policies issued
by such carriers are viable.  By enacting a separate and distinct sec-
tion to cover medical malpractice reciprocal, California has at-
tempted to balance the right of subscribers to enter into reciprocal
contracts of insurance and the competing interest of the state to
regulate the insurers which operate in a field of great concern to
24 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 629.101. (West 2002). Note that powers of attorney are
often found in the subscriber agreement, and, as such, for the purposes of this article,
references to powers of attorney and subscriber agreements are synonymous.
25 CAL. INS. CODE § 1280.7 (Deering 2002).
26 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 942.002(c).
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the general public.27  Other jurisdictions have recognized the spe-
cial nature of reciprocals by exempting them from certain insur-
ance laws and by enacting specific regulations where necessary.28
As will be discussed below, states actively involved in regulating
reciprocals may statutorily define the relative rights of subscribers,
the advisory committee and the attorney-in-fact.  However, the rela-
tionships among these three bodies are determined not only by
state statute, but also by contracts which are written within the pe-
rimeters permitted by applicable laws.  As this article turns to a dis-
cussion of the relationships, it is well to remember that both the
germane state law and the contractual provisions addressing the
reciprocal’s governing bodies may vary significantly.
SUBSCRIBERS
The dual status of subscribers as insurers and insureds elimi-
nates the layer of profit that would otherwise inure to the benefit
of a separately owned insurer.29   However, the unity of producer
and product user leaves a void where it would otherwise exist in the
infrastructure that is provided by the traditional insurer.  It is this
vacuum which necessitates the role of the committee and attorney-
in-fact.  The powers of the committee and the attorney-in-fact are
derived from subscribers and are to be exercised for the benefit of
subscribers who are true principals of the enterprise for all
purposes.30
As has been discussed, among the conditions of membership
in a reciprocal may be the advance by new subscribers of capital
surplus that stands as a reserve to pay claims and administration
expenses.31  Part or all of this capital surplus advanced by subscrib-
ers may be lost,32 but the risk to subscribers is not limited to the
advance of capital.33 The subscriber agreement may provide for an
assessment that means that each subscriber may be contractually
responsible for making additional payments of capital to the recip-
rocal beyond the initial advance.34  This contingent liability may be
27 See generally CAL. INS. CODE § 1280.7.
28 For example, pursuant to TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 942.002(c), but reciprocals
in Texas are prohibited from writing life insurance.
29 See COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d., supra note 3, at § 39:48.
30 In re Manufacturing Lumberman’s Underwriters, 18 F.Supp. 114 (D. Mo 1936).
31 See COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d., supra note 3, at § 39:48.
32 Id. at  § 38:56.
33 In Pennsylvania, for example, there is contingent subscriber liability if free and
indivisible surplus is less than 100% of capital surplus. See supra pp. 4-5.
34 43 AM.JUR.2d, Insurance § 80 (2002).
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triggered when surplus drops below a comfort level that the state
considers sufficient to maintain the reciprocal’s stability.35  Moreo-
ver, if surplus is insufficient to pay claims, the subscriber, as an in-
sured, may be exposed to personal liability for any portion of a
claim that is not paid through insurance.  Given this potential per-
sonal liability, the financial exposure of subscribers of a reciprocal
may be compared to that of members of  a partnership.36
In light of these potentialities, the subscribers of the recipro-
cal will want membership to be selective.  Subscribers rely on each
other’s relatively low risk potential.37  They also have an incentive
to set the capital contribution of each member at a high level to
create a sufficient reserve to satisfy claims without the need for as-
sessments.  The payment of dividends may also be restrictive.38
Subscribers may be more concerned with that aspect of the recip-
rocal that involves insuring against risk than with the insured’s po-
tential for saving costs and generating income.  The former
concern deals with lack of insurance protection that may lead to
significant personal liability for unpaid claims.
In light of such significant risks, subscribers have good reason
to follow the reciprocal’s activities, particularly its finances.   Unfor-
tunately, most subscribers have neither the time nor the expertise
to become actively involved in the insurance enterprise. Instead,
they rely upon their advisory committee or upon the attorney-in-
fact to protect their interests.
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
State law determines whether reciprocals are required to have
an advisory committee, and if so, to what extent such a committee
must govern the affairs of the insurance enterprise.39  However,
any given jurisdiction will address the advisory committee’s role
that is determined by competing considerations.  In certain juris-
dictions, the advisory committee can avoid supervisory responsibil-
ity by entering into a management agreement with an agent
35 E.g., 40 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 964(d).
36 See Mitchell v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 91 P. 2d 176 (1939) (comparing
subscribers to holders of stock in an insurance company).
37 43 AM.JUR.2d, Insurance §§ 77 et. seq.
38 See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 6106(a)(3)(G).
39 A distinction should be made between regulation of the reciprocal’s internal
organization and its interface with the public.  Although these two aspects of the re-
ciprocal differ, it is the former that is now under discussion.  The latter would involve
the issuance of insurance policies, and the payment of claims, such as activities which
the reciprocal would have in common with other insurers would be covered under
general insurance law provisions. See discussion supra note 2.
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designated to perform that function, and in other jurisdictions
there need not be an advisory committee at all.40  Among the juris-
dictions which do not require a committee are Pennsylvania41 and
Texas.42
In other jurisdictions, the protection of subscribers overrides
the subscribers’ right to contract freely.  With this protection
comes subscriber responsibility for the supervision of the recipro-
cal.  This responsibility is exercised through the advisory commit-
tee, which may be required to govern the reciprocal by statute.43
California allows the committee to exercise directly “any right re-
served to the subscribers. . ..”44 In New York, an advisory committee
has powers similar to those of a corporate board of directors45 and
the authority of the committee to oversee the affairs of the recipro-
cal is non-delegable, so that any attempts to transfer the commit-
tee’s supervisory functions to the attorney-in-fact will be held
void.46
The intent of the NAIC to impose non-delegable oversight re-
sponsibilities upon the committee is apparent from the Reciprocal
Act’s definition of “advisory committee,” which reads as follows:
a board, committee, counsel or any equivalent body made up of
subscribers that oversees the operations of the attorney-in-fact to
such extent as may be necessary to assure conformity with the
subscriber’s agreement and power of attorney for the benefit of
all subscribers.47
This definition mandates that the committee supervise the attor-
ney-in-fact to a degree commensurate with the need to protect sub-
scribers.48 The Reciprocal Act’s formulation permits flexibility as to
the scope of authority vested in the attorney-in-fact, to whom wide-
ranging operational functions may be transferred.  However, as
noted above, the NAIC’s formulation requires that the committee
retain ultimate supervisory authority.49   By requiring the commit-
40 As of the date the Reciprocal Act was drafted in 2000, approximately one half of
the states did not require an advisory committee. See Reciprocal Attorney-in-Fact
Model Act Drafting Note, Vol. II (1999).
41 40 PA.CONS. STAT.  § 961 et. seq.
42 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 942.
43 See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 6106(a)(3)(E); CAL. INS. CODE § 1308; FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 629.201.
44 CAL. INS. CODE § 1307(d).
45 N.Y. INS. LAW § 107(a)(11).
46 See Lumberman’s Underwriting Alliance v. Corcoran, 103 A.D.2d 947 (3d Dept.
1984), aff’d, 65 N.Y.2d 653 (1985).
47 Reciprocal Act § 2 (J).
48 Id.
49 Id.
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tee to oversee the attorney-in-fact “to such extent . . . necessary”50
to ensure compliance with the subscriber agreement and with the
power of attorney, the Reciprocal Act recognizes that the commit-
tee’s supervisory function cannot be transferred.  The greater the
authority contractually conferred upon the attorney-in-fact under
the subscriber agreement or power of attorney, the greater the
need for oversight by the committee to ensure conformity.
Under the Reciprocal Act, the subscriber agreement, which
must set forth certain enumerated duties of the attorney-in-fact
and may include additional provisions at the discretion of the par-
ties, is subject to approval by the committee and the Superinten-
dent.51  The need for committee approval gives the committee veto
power over the terms and conditions of the contract between each
subscriber and the attorney-in-fact.  In actuality, the committee’s
role is even more significant.  The subscriber agreement is a uni-
form document except for the particular subscriber’s name and
address, and subscribers, as individuals, have no ability to alter its
terms.52  The contract is likely to be drafted by the reciprocal’s at-
torneys in accordance with the committee’s instructions.  There-
fore, the committee is likely to author the subscriber agreement,
and the Reciprocal Act.
Jurisdictions following the Reciprocal Act by requiring an advi-
sory committee sometimes go no further than defining the com-
mittee’s role and providing that the committee will be established
by subscribers.  The instrument which is the logical source of the
advisory committee’s rights and obligations is the subscriber agree-
ment and the Reciprocal Act mandates that the committee be es-
tablished in this uniform contract between the reciprocal and each
of its members.53  New York follows the Reciprocal Act, requiring
that the subscriber agreement contain a clause establishing an advi-
sory committee, which is charged with regulating the attorney-in-
fact.54  California’s reciprocal law provides that the advisory com-
mittee’s powers may be enumerated in a power-of-attorney and
contracts made thereunder, leaving open the possibility that the
advisory committee be established by instruments other than the
subscriber agreement.55
50 Id.
51 The term “Superintendent” will refer to any state official who heads the state’s
Department of Insurance. See Reciprocal Act  § 5(C).
52 N.Y. INS. LAW § 6106(a)(2).
53 Reciprocal Act § 5 (A).
54 N.Y INS. LAW § 6106(a)(3)(E).
55 CAL. INS. CODE § 1307.
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Where a committee is required by state law, the committee’s
authority may vary widely, although certain basic duties are com-
monly addressed.  Under the Reciprocal Act, it is the committee’s
duty to keep itself informed and to inform subscribers concerning
the reciprocal’s operations.56  To fulfill this duty, the committee
itself must keep abreast of all significant developments, and is re-
quired to review material transactions concerning the reciprocal
and its financial condition.  The committee must meet at least an-
nually.57  Special meetings of the committee can also be called
whenever required.58  The committee is also required to provide
guidelines for the investment of the reciprocal’s assets and for
monitoring the use of the reciprocal’s funds.  In its oversight of the
attorney-in-fact, the committee may exercise significant managerial
powers.59
In those jurisdictions that follow the Reciprocal Act, the com-
mittee, acting on behalf of the reciprocal, will enter into negotia-
tions with the attorney-in-fact over the terms of the attorney-in-
fact’s retention. Such negotiations include the setting of an expira-
tion date for the attorney-in-fact’s appointment, and the selection
of a method for compensating the attorney-in-fact.  During the
course of the management agreement, the committee should re-
view the attorney-in-fact’s conduct on a frequent basis.  When the
reciprocal believes that the attorney-in-fact’s performance is defi-
cient, the reciprocal should take steps to remedy the problem.  Ul-
timately, a decision may have to be made to terminate the attorney-
in-fact.  New York follows the Reciprocal Act by providing that the
committee initiates the termination process by recommending the
discharge of the attorney-in-fact for a “stated cause.”60
Where an advisory committee is required to exercise ultimate
supervision over the reciprocal, the committee will play a signifi-
cant role in defining the attorney-in-fact’s operational duties.  The
independence of the committee is, therefore, of paramount impor-
tance.  This importance is recognized in the Reciprocal Act, sec-
tion 5B(1), which provides that at least two-thirds of the advisory
56 As the governing body of the reciprocal, the duty of each member of the advi-
sory committee is to become familiar with the reciprocal’s operations so as to be able
to properly supervise and control the attorney-in-fact.  Wolcott B. Dunham, Jr., 2 NEW
YORK INSURANCE LAW, § 23.02 [4](c) (Matthew Bender).
57 Reciprocal Act § 5B(1).
58 Reciprocal Act § 5B(6).
59 Opinion Letter from Audrey M. Samers, Deputy Superintendent and General
Counsel of the New York State Insurance Department, to Martin Minkowitz (Novem-
ber 6, 2001) (on file with the State of New York Insurance Department).
60 N.Y. INS. LAW § 6106(a)(4)(C).
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committee must be subscribers, officers, or directors of subscriber
corporations, and not more than one-third of whom are to be fi-
nancially interested in the attorney-in-fact.  In this manner, the Re-
ciprocal Act attempts to maintain the committee’s independence
from the attorney-in-fact. Additionally, the Reciprocal Act seeks to
avoid the consequences of the reciprocal’s domination by the at-
torney-in-fact, which clearly has a conflict of interest with the recip-
rocal concerning the terms of the attorney-in-fact’s compensation
and authority.61
THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
Section 5A of the Reciprocal Act provides that the fountain-
head of the attorney-in-fact’s powers is the subscriber agreement:
The authority of the attorney-in-fact to manage the affairs of the
reciprocal shall be derived from the subscriber’s agreement exe-
cuted by each subscriber . . .
Some jurisdictions allow the attorney-in-fact’s duties to be set
forth in either the subscriber agreement or in a separate manage-
ment agreement between the reciprocal, acting through the com-
mittee and the attorney-in-fact.  Because the management
agreement is easier to amend, its employment to define the attor-
ney-in-fact’s duties is more practical than the use of a subscriber
agreement.  Changes in the terms and conditions of the retention
of the attorney-in-fact after the initial appointment would require
the amendment of the subscriber agreement, which entails a pro-
cess that involves a subscriber vote, and triggers a cumbersome pro-
cess.  In contrast, a management agreement can be modified after
a vote of the majority of the committee.  The use of a management
agreement vests the advisory committee with the responsibility of
negotiating with the attorney-in-fact – an approach that removes
subscribers from the process of setting the terms of the attorney-in-
fact’s employment.  With large reciprocals, subscriber involvement
is a practical impossibility in any event.  It must be presumed that
even without subscriber involvement, the elected representatives of
the reciprocal will act in the best interests of subscribers and will
keep their constituents informed of any significant negotiations
with the attorney-in-fact.62
61 See also CAL. INS. CODE § 1310; N.Y. INS. LAW § 6106; FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 629.201(2).
62 N.Y. INS. LAW § 6106(a)(4).  Because the committee is the representative body
of the subscribers, the former’s right to retain counsel for the latter is beyond
question.
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The basic duties of the attorney-in-fact are set forth in Section
C of the Reciprocal Act, which allows the parties to provide for
additional contractual rights and safeguards.63  Whether additional
duties are enumerated is largely a function of the particular field in
which the attorney-in-fact operates.  For example, it is expected
that a reciprocal which provides medical malpractice insurance in
states mandating that continuing medical education courses be
taken by physicians would retain the services of the attorney-in-fact
to administer a program that offers accredited courses to the recip-
rocal’s insureds.
The Reciprocal Act and some state statutes recognize the ne-
cessity of entrusting the attorney-in-fact with the reciprocal’s prop-
erty, which will be held by the attorney-in-fact as a fiduciary.64  Such
property includes subscriber funds that are in the name of the re-
ciprocal but may be drawn upon by the attorney-in-fact subject to
certain conditions.65  An attorney-in-fact may service more than
one reciprocal.  If it does, the attorney-in-fact will be required to
separate the assets of each of its principals.66  Business information
concerning each reciprocal should be maintained in confidence.
The attorney-in-fact is also required to maintain records, and
to provide reports to the committee concerning the reciprocal’s
operations.67  During the period of its retention, the attorney-in-
fact has control over the daily activities of the reciprocal, and exer-
cises such power on behalf of the subscribers under the supervision
of the committee.  However, all the records of the reciprocal in the
possession of the attorney-in-fact are owned by the reciprocal and
upon termination such records must be returned to the
reciprocal.68
Under common law principles, the attorney-in-fact’s duty of
loyalty extends beyond protecting the intangible assets of the recip-
rocal.  The doctrine of corporate opportunities applies to the attor-
ney-in-fact. In fact, this doctrine prevents the attorney-in-fact from
taking advantage of any business information acquired in connec-
tion with its operations of the reciprocal without first affording the
reciprocal the benefit of such information.69  Under well-estab-
lished agency law, an attorney-in-fact will also be barred from re-
63 See also N.Y. INS. LAW § 6106(b)(1).
64 Reciprocal Act, Drafting Note to § 5(C); N.Y. INS. LAW § 6106(a)(4)(D).
65 Id.
66 N.Y. INS. LAW § 6106(a)(4)(E).
67 N.Y. INS. LAW § 6106(a)(4)(I).
68 N.Y. INS. LAW § 6106(a)(4)(L).
69 Industrial Indem. Co. v. Goldenstate Co., 256 P.2d 77 (1953).
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vealing confidences of its principal, or competing with the
principal with the use of proprietary information.70
The source of the attorney-in-fact’s powers is the subscribers,
who ordinarily appoint the attorney-in-fact through a power of at-
torney which may be contained in the subscriber agreement.71  In
the case of a very small subscribership, who personally choose the
attorney-in-fact, subscribers may have meaningful involvement in
the appointment process.  However, with larger reciprocals, there
is typically a formative stage during which time an interim advisory
committee is established, approves an interim attorney-in-fact, and
proposes a management agreement with its recommended attor-
ney-in-fact.72   After the reciprocal has been organized, subscribers
are solicited and enter into agreements that ratify the appointment
of the proposed attorney-in-fact by the interim committee.73  The
subscribers usually have no knowledge of the attorney-in-fact and
rely upon their representatives to make an appropriate choice.
Considering the inability of individual subscribers to change the
terms of the subscriber agreement, their choice is limited to either
becoming a member of the reciprocal with the existing attorney-in-
fact, or flatly declining membership.  After becoming a member, a
subscriber can propose the removal of the attorney-in-fact, and
may later vote on such termination.74
Although the scope of authority of an attorney-in-fact is largely
dependent upon the subscriber agreement or the management
agreement, in those jurisdictions where a committee cannot dele-
gate its duties to the attorney-in-fact, the former can be compared,
as noted above, with a corporate a board of directors.75  In such
cases, the attorney-in-fact’s role would be somewhat analogous to
that of a chief executive officer of a corporation.  Under the Recip-
rocal Act, one of the roles of the attorney-in-fact is to “act for and
bind subscribers in all transactions relating to or arising out of the
operations of a reciprocal insurer.”76  This privilege allows the at-
torney-in-fact to enter into binding contracts with third persons,
70 See generally AM.JUR.2d Agency §§ 225, 228 (2002).
71 COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d., supra note 3, at § 39:54, TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §
942.051(c); N.Y. INS. LAW §6106(a)(3)(A).
72 In those jurisdictions that require the reciprocal to be licensed, the Superinten-
dent will require submission of documentation to assess viability.  The attorney-in-
fact’s role will be scrutinized during this process.
73 Such ratifications may take the form of the subscriber’s execution of the sub-
scriber agreement that contains the power of attorney.
74 See infra p. 19.
75 N.Y. INS. LAW § 107(a)(11).
76 Reciprocal Act § 2(C).
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thereby providing the attorney-in-fact with the authority to signifi-
cantly impact upon subscribers.  Typically, the attorney-in-fact acts
as an administrator, issuing policies, contracting for services with
third parties such as outside law firms that represent insureds, ad-
ministering claims files, and purchasing and selling personal prop-
erty.  The necessity of the attorney-in-fact’s fulfilling these
functions is easily understood when one considers that the commit-
tee is unlikely to have employees, or even a location from which to
operate.  Ordinarily, the committee will provide the attorney-in-
fact with the authority to engage in limited transactions within
budgetary guidelines set by the committee.  Typically, the commit-
tee will require the attorney-in-fact to obtain pre-approval of con-
tracts which are not in the ordinary course of business or which
have a material impact upon the reciprocal’s future operations.
Any restrictions upon the attorney-in-fact’s right to bind subscrib-
ers, however, will not affect those third parties who have no notice
of limitations upon the agent’s authority.77  Thus, even where the
attorney-in-fact has engaged in a transaction which is beyond its
actual authority, the agent’s apparent authority may enable the at-
torney-in-fact to bind subscribers with respect to third parties.78
Prudence, therefore, invites timely communication of any restric-
tions upon the attorney-in-fact to third parties, particularly in juris-
dictions where no provision is made for an advisory committee and
may be accomplished by  limiting the power of attorney filed with
the state.
Other areas of special concern are spelled out in the Recipro-
cal Act, as well as in the statutes of many jurisdictions.79  Particular
attention should be devoted to the manner in which the attorney-
in-fact is to handle the funds of the reciprocal.  Contractual limita-
tions should be placed on the kinds of investments that the attor-
ney-in-fact can make on behalf of the reciprocal.  Where the
attorney-in-fact is given some discretion in financial matters, the
committee should at least set guidelines for pursuing the recipro-
cal’s investment strategies.80  The Reciprocal Act requires that the
attorney-in-fact report to the committee on the financial condition
of the reciprocal and advise the committee of any significant
transactions.81
Among other basic duties that are enumerated in the Recipro-
77 But cf. Hill v. Blanco Nat. Bank, 179 S.W.2d 999, 1001 (Ct. Civil App. Tex 1944).
78 Pacific Finance Corp. v. Knox, 247 S.W.2d 154, 162 (1952).
79 Reciprocal Act § 2 (C).
80 Reciprocal Act § 5 (C)(4).
81 Reciprocal Act § 5 (C)(8) & 5(C)(9)(b)(ii)(11).
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cal Act are the attorney-in-fact’s responsibility to maintain books
and records of the reciprocal,82 to arrange for the election of com-
mittee members, to call meetings of subscribers, and to effectuate
any required amendments to the subscriber agreements.83  Many
duties will also follow from those enumerated in the subscriber
agreement or management agreement.  The attorney-in-fact’s role
of administering day-to-day operations of the reciprocal will doubt-
lessly encompass a wide range of activities that are not specifically
set forth.
Earlier in this article, a comparison was made between an at-
torney-in-fact and a chief executive officer of a corporation,84 but
there are differences.  Particularly in those states that do not per-
mit the delegation of authority of the committee, the attorney-in-
fact’s powers may appear to be more ministerial than those en-
joyed by many executives, who may be involved to some degree in
establishing and implementing corporate policy.  In such jurisdic-
tions, setting and implementing policy is ordinarily in the exclusive
province of the committee.85  However, the de facto power of the
attorney-in-fact appears greater than its de jure authority, and such
actual power may exceed that of corporate executives who can or-
dinarily be terminated by the board of directors.86 Under the Re-
ciprocal Act and under certain state statutes, the attorney-in-fact
may not be terminated by action of the committee alone, which
circumstance also increases the actual power of the attorney-in-
fact.87  A practical consequence of this situation is readily apparent.
With the resources of the reciprocal at its disposal, the attorney-in-
fact can control the reciprocal in defiance of the committee until a
court order forces compliance.  This dilemma exposes the vulnera-
bility of the reciprocal to a disobedient attorney-in-fact.  An even
more serious problem is presented by potential breaches of fiduci-
ary duty by a dishonest attorney-in-fact.
The possible consequences of the attorney-in-fact’s dishonesty
82 Reciprocal Act § 5(C)(8) & (9).
83 Reciprocal Act § 5 (C)(1).
84 Supra, p. 8.
85 See Lumberman’s Underwriting Alliance v. Corcoran, 103 A.D.2d 947 (3d Dept.
1984) aff’d 65 N.Y.2d 653 (1985).
86 To be certain the termination of a corporate president by its board of directors
may lead to  a suit for breach of contract, but it is doubtful that the court will restore
the chief executive to his office when the latter has lost the confidence of the board.
See COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d § 39:53.
87 E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 6106(a)(4)(C).  However, in New York, when the Superin-
tendent has approved a subscriber agreement, statutory termination provisions will be
subject to the subscriber agreement.
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and dereliction of duty are treated by the Reciprocal Act, which
envisions that the attorney-in-fact’s transgressions will be covered
by a surety bond.  It would appear that in some jurisdictions there
is a trade-off between the requirement that there be an advisory
committee and the requirement of posting a bond.  In Texas while
there are no requirements that there be an advisory committee, a
bond must be posted by the attorney-in-fact.88  In New York, where
an advisory committee must supervise an attorney-in-fact, there is
no provision for the posting of a bond.  The Reciprocal Act pro-
vides that the Superintendent may require the attorney-in-fact to
post a bond and obtain an Errors & Omissions Policy of
Insurance.89
The surety bond should protect against defalcations.  How-
ever, the Errors & Omissions (hereinafter “E&O”) Policy will have
limited utility.  It is doubtful that any E&O insurer would cover
claims for ordinary negligence advanced by a reciprocal against its
own attorney-in-fact.  The possibility of collusion between two inter-
related companies would likely lead to an exclusion.  Moreover,
there will be no protection against potentially significant losses oc-
casioned by an attorney-in-fact that enters into ill-advised contracts
with third parties.
Clearly, the risk to subscribers posed by a substandard or dis-
loyal attorney-in-fact is greater than the risk posed to corporate
shareholders presented by similarly deficient executive officers.  As
has been discussed, the liability of subscribers may not be limited
to the capital surplus they advanced to the reciprocal.90  In con-
trast, shareholders of a corporation can lose no more than their
investment.  As also previously discussed, since the reciprocal pro-
vides insurance protection to subscribers, the financial health of
the company has importance beyond the reciprocal’s role as an
investment vehicle.
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ATTORNEY-
IN-FACT AND THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
In light of the potential consequences to subscribers of a sub-
standard or disloyal attorney-in-fact there is a palpable need for the
oversight of the attorney-in-fact by a body to which the attorney-in-
fact is subordinate.  It is, therefore, difficult to understand why ap-
proximately half of the states were not providing for a subscriber
88 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 942.052.
89 Reciprocal Act §4(B) & (C).
90 Supra, p. 7.
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advisory committee at the time the Reciprocal Act was drafted in
2000.  Based upon the assumption that self-interest is the primary
consideration, a committee of subscribers is more likely to protect
their own concerns and those of their colleagues than the attorney-
in-fact who does not have an equivalent personal stake.  Indeed, an
attorney-in-fact that is not wholly owned by the reciprocal may at-
tempt to maximize profits at the expense of the reciprocal, particu-
larly if such attorney-in-fact provides services for more than one
reciprocal and is therefore less dependent upon an individual re-
ciprocal’s good will.
However, at least in those jurisdictions that confer upon the
advisory committee the ultimate power to govern the reciprocal,
the attorney-in-fact should not have the ability to thwart the advi-
sory committee.  While it is true that the attorney-in-fact is the ap-
pointed agent of subscribers who authorize the attorney-in-fact to
enter into transactions with third parties, this function can argua-
bly be performed by the committee, and, in any event, is an ar-
rangement of convenience.  The attorney-in-fact’s appointment is
certainly not meant to remove the attorney-in-fact from the ambit
of the committee’s oversight.  Nor is there any evidence that the
Reciprocal Act intends an attorney-in-fact to exercise a check upon
the committee’s supervisory powers through the attorney-in-fact’s
ability to bind subscribers.  Rather, the committee is established as
an extension of the subscribership, with the power to control the
reciprocal’s affairs as principal, through the attorney-in-fact as an
agent.91  To reflect this, the authority of the committee is some-
times referred to as “ultimate.”92
Vesting the committee with oversight functions is meant to
guard against substandard performance and intentional abuses by
the attorney-in-fact, and assures, at least on paper, that the recipro-
cal’s elected representatives will govern its affairs and shape its fu-
ture.  However, as touched upon earlier, the committee’s right to
direct the attorney-in-fact is not necessarily accompanied with the
ability to effectively execute its directives.  One reason that the
committee may be unable to enforce its authority as set forth in
statute or agreement is that the attorney-in-fact has actual control
over the operations of the reciprocal.  This may be true even in
those states like California where the reciprocal statute provides
that the subscribers’ board has the right to directly perform the
91 See Lumberman’s Underwriting Alliance v. Corcoran, 103 A.D.2d 947 (3d Dept.
1984) aff’d 65 N.Y.2d 653 (1985).
92 See N.Y. INS. LAW § 6101(a).
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reciprocal’s operations,93 because the reciprocal may delegate ex-
tensive powers to the attorney-in-fact.  Regardless of the circum-
stances leading to the attorney-in-fact’s attainment of actual
control owed to the reciprocal, such acquisition of power is imprac-
ticable and has serious consequences.
Cooperation between the committee and the attorney-in-fact
is the product of the attorney-in-fact’s voluntary recognition of the
committee as its superior with respect to the reciprocal’s opera-
tions.  When such voluntary recognition is lacking, problems arise.
If the attorney-in-fact defies the committee, the committee will be
faced with a dilemma.  As we have seen, the attorney-in-fact has
possession of the reciprocal’s assets, its records, its communication
systems, including phones, facsimile machines, e-mail addresses.
The attorney-in-fact also ordinarily controls the location where the
reciprocal’s affairs are conducted,94 and employs the personnel
that conduct the reciprocal’s operations.  If faced with a rebellious
attorney-in-fact, the committee will be forced to turn to the Super-
intendent or the courts, and even while such a case against the
attorney-in-fact is pending, the reciprocal will likely be forced to
rely on the attorney-in-fact to continue to operate the reciprocal.
In defending against such a suit, the attorney-in-fact may claim the
committee’s order is not lawful, or is not in the interests of sub-
scribers. Though these defenses may be challenged for a variety of
reasons, the issue will have to be explored to a greater or lesser
degree, virtually guaranteeing some delay.  Under such circum-
stances, an attorney-in-fact’s compliance with the committee’s di-
rectives is not to be expected until the Superintendent, or a court,
issues the appropriate order.  Administrative or judicial inquiry
into the pertinent facts will occasion a substantial investment of
time and energy by all involved.95
Practical considerations may well restrain the committee in its
exercise of powers over the attorney-in-fact with respect to minor
issues, and minor dissatisfaction with the attorney-in-fact is likely to
be suppressed.  However, there may come a point at which the
committee sees no alternative to discharging the attorney-in-fact.
As discussed below, the Reciprocal Act provides for a process by
93 CAL. INS. CODE § 1307(d).
94 The attorney-in-fact, which is permitted to act on behalf of several reciprocals, is
likely to own its own offices, or to lease space from a third party. See supra p.15 and
accompanying footnotes.
95 The reciprocal may be forced to seek an injunction, which would likely require
a hearing.
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which the committee can initiate termination, although the pro-
cess is seriously flawed.
CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND THE
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
In any dispute between the committee and the attorney-in-
fact, the legal authority of the advisory committee is confronted by
the practical consequences of the attorney-in-fact’s actual control
of the reciprocal’s assets and operations.  As has been discussed
above, an attorney-in-fact may be able to frustrate the exercise of
oversight powers by the committee.  For example, where the recip-
rocal’s funds are controlled by the attorney-in-fact, the agent may
refuse to make payments directed by the committee, particularly
payments that relate to the supervision of the attorney-in-fact, such
as fees to auditors.  The attorney-in-fact may also frustrate the com-
mittee’s supervisory function by obstructing the committee’s access
to the reciprocal’s records.  In all probability, the employees of the
attorney-in-fact will be the only staff directly involved in the day-to-
day operations of the reciprocal.  Therefore, notwithstanding the
common law rule that a sub-agent owes a duty to the ultimate prin-
cipal, it is probable that such employees will follow the directives of
their employer, rather than the directives of the committee.
Of course, incentives for the attorney-in-fact to follow the com-
mittee’s directives include the committee’s right both to regulate
the compensation of the attorney-in-fact, and to decline to enter
into a new management agreement with the attorney-in-fact when
the old management agreement expires.  However, even a commit-
tee that considers its attorney-in-fact’s performance substandard
may well desire to avoid an open conflict.  Change is discouraged
by the potential disruption of business inherent in any attorney-in-
fact’s substitution, which entails a transfer of operations.  Even
though the old attorney-in-fact may be obligated to cooperate dur-
ing the transition period,96 there may be little motivation for its
doing so.  In those jurisdictions where a new attorney-in-fact must
be approved by the Department of Insurance, a process that can be
somewhat involved, the problems of transition will be intensified
even in those cases where the old attorney-in-fact is simply being
replaced at the end of the management agreement.  Since a deci-
sion to replace an attorney-in-fact has to be made well in advance
of the expiration date so that arrangements can be made to trans-
96 Supra note 59.
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fer the numerous functions of the insurer to a new agent, the old
attorney-in-fact would have significant time to create mischief.
Because employees of the attorney-in-fact carry out the recip-
rocal’s daily functions, the appointment of a new attorney-in-fact
will also result in the potential loss of employees who understand
the operational details of the reciprocal.  Employees of the old at-
torney-in-fact may be hired by the new attorney-in-fact where cir-
cumstances permit,97 but transitional tasks are daunting.  In part,
these difficulties can be addressed in the subscriber agreement or
in a management agreement, either of which can provide for the
committee’s direct access to, and right to direct, all employees of
the attorney-in-fact.98  By agreement the parties can also provide
for the right to immediate possession and control of records and
property, including the site of the reciprocal’s operations, and the
right to operate through independent third parties even before a
new attorney-in-fact is in place.  Subject to the superintendent’s ap-
proval, an agreement can also provide for the suspension of the
old attorney-in-fact with the right of the committee to operate on
its own, through key employees or through the hiring of new em-
ployees before the expiration of the management agreement.99
Another practical approach is to contractually provide for opera-
tions through certain employees of the committee who would be
empowered to direct the employees of the attorney-in-fact.  Appli-
cable statutes may have to be modified to permit such agreements.
At the current time, many jurisdictions do not address these
issues.100
These practical difficulties tend to promote an uneasy co-exis-
tence between a marginally performing attorney-in-fact and a com-
mittee that would like to replace the agent but also has evaluated
its cost as outweighing the possible benefits.  The question is how
much inefficiency will be tolerated.
97 In certain states, the reciprocal cannot operate without an attorney-in-fact, e.g.,
Texas and Pennsylvania.  Because the appointment of a new attorney-in-fact and the
termination of the old attorney-in-fact require Superintendent approval in such states,
the existing attorney-in-fact will have substantial prior notice of any plans to termi-
nate.  Until termination is accomplished and a new attorney-in-fact installed, the ex-
isting attorney-in-fact will be in place, and the reciprocal will have to deal with the
existing attorney-in-fact.
98 However, the attorney-in-fact may refuse to enter into a management agreement
allowing the reciprocal to control its employees, particularly if the attorney-in-fact op-
erates more than one reciprocal.
99 The issue may turn in part, on whether the employees have written agreements
with the attorney-in-fact that restrict the employees from working for the reciprocal.
100 There is no provision for an interim attorney-in-fact under the Reciprocal Act.
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As discussed, difficulties may arise even in the simple case
where a management agreement expires and a new attorney-in-fact
must be appointed to take over the functions of the old.  The
problems are multiplied when an advisory committee decides to
terminate the attorney-in-fact during the term of the management
agreement.  Such is true not only because serious disputes between
the committee and the attorney-in-fact are the probable cause of
the decision to terminate before the expiration date, but also be-
cause of the uncertainties in the termination process.
TERMINATION OF THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
Some jurisdictions have enacted statutes to deal with termina-
tion of the attorney-in-fact during the term of a management
agreement.  For example, New York largely follows the Reciprocal
Act.101  Unfortunately, the Reciprocal Act does not provide a clear
model for termination and is extremely impractical.  The Recipro-
cal Act provides that upon a majority vote of the advisory commit-
tee, a recommendation of termination can be sent to subscribers
for a “stated cause”.102  At least thirty days in advance of mailing the
recommendation to subscribers, a special meeting is to be held
where subscribers can vote in person or by proxy on termina-
tion.103  The attorney-in-fact is allowed to mail “appropriate” mater-
ials to subscribers in connection with the committee’s
recommendation of termination.104  A two-thirds vote of subscrib-
ers in favor of terminating the attorney-in-fact is then required.105
There are several problems with this formulation.  First, it
does not define “termination.”   If there is a management agree-
ment between the reciprocal and the attorney-in-fact containing an
expiration date, would this be a termination – e.g., would a sub-
scriber vote be necessary to give effect to the expiration date?
Logic dictates that a contractually agreed upon expiration date will
not fall within the scope of the termination provision, yet the Re-
ciprocal Act does not explicitly address this point.  However, the
Reciprocal Act and some states provide that statutory termination
provisions are “subject to” any provision in a subscriber or manage-
ment agreement approved by the Superintendent.106  A Superin-
tendent-approved management agreement with an expiration date
101 Compare N.Y INS. LAW § 6106(a)(4)(C) with Reciprocal Act § 5(C)(3).
102 Reciprocal Act § 5 (C)(3).
103 See N.Y. INS. LAW § 6106(a)(4)(C); Reciprocal Act § 5(C)(3).
104 N.Y. INS. LAW § 6106(a)(4)(C); Reciprocal Act § 5 (C)(3).
105 Id.
106 Id.
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or a description of the means of terminating the attorney-in-fact
will presumably be outside the range of the Reciprocal Act’s termi-
nation provision.107  Therefore, prudence dictates that legal coun-
sel for the reciprocal and the attorney-in-fact draft management
agreements that deal clearly with the termination issue and follow
such provisions where approved by the Superintendent.
The Reciprocal Act and the statutes that follow it are flawed in
a number of other ways as well.  As noted above, the termination
process is initiated by a vote of the committee that recommends
termination for a “stated cause.”  In failing to define “stated cause,”
the Reciprocal Act leaves open the question of the proper grounds
for the recommendation.  It is reasonable, then, to assume that
“stated cause” is whatever reasons are set forth in the management
agreement.  In the event the management agreement is silent on
this issue, “stated cause” is presumably whatever the committee
considers a basis for termination, provided such basis is set forth in
the written recommendation to subscribers.  Under this interpreta-
tion of the Reciprocal Act, “cause” could be anything the commit-
tee in its discretion considers appropriate, including the
committee’s own inability to work with the attorney-in-fact.  Had
the drafters of the Reciprocal Act intended otherwise, they would
have stated such.  For example, the Reciprocal Act could have re-
quired that the cause for termination be of a nature and degree
sufficient to cause the cancellation of a contract during its term.
The Reciprocal Act’s failure to set the bar this high108 indicates an
intention to provide greater flexibility.  It must also be
remembered that the parties can provide greater certainty as to
what constitutes cause for termination through the wording of the
subscriber agreement or the management agreement.  In addition,
the attorney-in-fact has an opportunity to present its case against
the committee’s recommendation, and two-thirds of subscribers
must vote in favor of termination.109  These are checks against un-
fair action by the committee.
Another problem under the Reciprocal Act is the need to
schedule a special subscriber meeting for voting on termination at
least thirty (30) days in advance.  However, where the cause for
termination is serious misconduct, for example, misappropriation
107 Case law distinguishing between cancellations within the term of a contract on
one hand and expiration date based upon an agreed end term of a contract on the
other also suggest an interpretation excluding expiration dates from the ambit of
statutory termination provisions.
108 Reciprocal Act § 5 (C)(3).
109 Id. See also N.Y. INS. LAW § 6106(a)(4)(C).
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of funds, immediate action is required.  Other causes for termina-
tion, such as a failure to properly invoice subscribers, or to main-
tain records, may appear less emergent but can also have fatal
consequences before the termination process is over.  Presumably,
the Superintendent could address serious problems by appointing
a receiver.  However, this action is quite drastic and likely to have
serious ramifications for the insurer.  The confidence of subscrib-
ers, rating organizations and financial institutions is likely to be
shaken if such action is taken. It would be preferable to provide
that in more serious cases termination can be effectuated by a
super-majority vote of the advisory committee, subject to the ap-
proval of the Superintendent.
Also troublesome is the fact that the Reciprocal Act provides
that the attorney-in-fact shall conduct the mailing of the termina-
tion materials.110  The attorney-in-fact’s incentive for cooperating
in the process is not apparent.  On the contrary, the potential for
misconduct in connection with the mailing is obvious.  It would
seem far more practical to provide that a third party who is in-
volved in the affairs of both the reciprocal and the attorney-in-fact
conduct the mailing.  In some states, this can be done by an audi-
tor who by statute reviews the statements of both the attorney-in-
fact and the reciprocal.
By providing the attorney-in-fact with the right to submit “ap-
propriate” materials with the committee’s recommendation to sub-
scribers, the Reciprocal Act also presents further conflicts.  What is
“appropriate” will likely be a matter of significant difference of
opinion.  The materials submitted by the attorney-in-fact may be
defamatory or misleading; yet the attorney-in-fact may insist that
such materials be included in the mailing.  Any materials drafted
by the attorney-in-fact should therefore be sent separately by the
attorney-in-fact, at its own cost and expense, along with its own
proxy.  The attorney-in-fact would likely delay the process by re-
questing additional time to draft such materials.  To avoid this, the
Reciprocal Act could propose that the attorney-in-fact have a speci-
fied period of time to prepare and send out its own materials, and
failing to do so would be to forfeit the right.
Finally, the Reciprocal Act does not adequately address issues
concerning the integrity of the process.  There should be a provi-
sion authorizing a party other than the attorney-in-fact to supervise
the special subscriber meeting to vote on the committee’s termina-
tion recommendation and to collect and count the proxies.  The
110 Reciprocal Act § 5 (C)(3).
58 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:35
integrity of the termination process should be assured by placing it
under the auspices of someone who would be indifferent to its out-
come or by specifically conferring upon representatives of both the
committee and the attorney-in-fact the right to monitor the
process.
As noted above, in those jurisdictions that follow the Recipro-
cal Act by providing for termination for an unspecified reason,
what constitutes “cause” should be left to subscribers.  In those ju-
risdictions that do not address the question of termination during
the term of the management agreement, grounds for terminating
a service contract during its term will presumably apply.  Such
grounds include material breach of contract, fraud and any act or
omission for which rescission of contract is an appropriate remedy.
This is a significant standard and any suit for termination will likely
be plagued by delay.  When a suit to replace the attorney-in-fact
advances grounds warranting immediate action, preliminary in-
junctive relief may be the only means of preserving the insurer’s
rights.
Depending upon the surrounding circumstances, termination
of the attorney-in-fact pursuant to statute or contract may leave
open the contention that the power of attorney conferred by each
individual subscriber upon the attorney-in-fact must be cancelled
separately.  This argument ignores the fact that while an attorney-
in-fact can represent more than one reciprocal, only one attorney-
in-fact can represent any reciprocal at a given time.  By providing
for the termination of the attorney-in-fact by a two-thirds subscriber
vote, the Reciprocal Act recognizes that as many as one-third of
subscribers might be compelled to yield to the will of two-thirds as
concerns the discharge of the attorney-in-fact.  Any requirement
that there be an amendment of the individual subscriber agree-
ment following a two-thirds termination vote would nullify the
super-majority vote of subscribers favoring termination.  This result
is clearly unintended.  In any event, even the colorable argument
that individual powers of attorney must be cancelled can be
avoided through a subscriber agreement that is subject to statutory
or contractual provisions dealing with the means of terminating
the attorney-in-fact.  The Reciprocal Act’s requirement that provi-
sions of Section 5 be part of the subscriber agreement leads to the
incorporation of the termination provision, thereby avoiding the
argument that individual powers of attorney have to be terminated
in order to remove an attorney-in-fact.
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ADDRESSING PROBLEMS THROUGH THE SUBSCRIBER AGREEMENT AND
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT
As noted above, the relationship among the subscribers, the
advisory committee and the attorney-in-fact is often addressed in
two separate contracts.  The subscriber agreement is a three-party
document among the subscriber, the attorney-in-fact and the recip-
rocal, which will ordinarily contain the provision appointing the
attorney-in-fact.  It is suggested that this document also be utilized
to address limitations upon the type of power of attorney granted
to the attorney-in-fact.  For example, limitations can be placed
upon the type of contracts that can be entered into by the attorney-
in-fact on behalf of subscribers or the agreement can require that
certain contracts be countersigned by members of the advisory
committee.  The degree to which the attorney-in-fact controls in-
vestments may also be limited to avoid potential defalcation.  For
example, the countersignatures of advisory committee members
may be required for withdrawal of the reciprocal’s funds.
The management agreement between the committee and the
attorney-in-fact can also be employed to restrict the rights of the
attorney-in-fact.  Where utilized, this two-party contract between
the reciprocal — acting through the advisory committee — and
the attorney-in-fact will define the attorney-in-fact’s authority and
obligations and will contain an expiration date.  The management
agreement can set forth the grounds for terminating the attorney-
in-fact before its expiration date.  The difficulties in operating the
reciprocal during a period of conflict with the existing attorney-in-
fact or immediately following termination of the attorney-in-fact
can also be addressed in the management agreement.  Provided
the jurisdiction in question permits, there can be provisions for the
direct retention of employees of the attorney-in-fact, the immedi-
ate suspension of a disloyal or incompetent attorney-in-fact and the
appointment of a provisional attorney-in-fact through whom opera-
tions can be temporarily conducted.
Whether contained in a subscriber agreement or management
agreement, contractual provisions empowering the committee to
protect the reciprocal should be drafted to provide the necessary
details for implementing statutory provisions that define the role of
the advisory committee to include exercising ultimate supervisory
and managerial power over the reciprocal.  The committee’s em-
ployment of outside consultants, such as auditors and accountants,
is a means by which the committee can reduce its dependency
upon the attorney-in-fact.  The committee may also secure a source
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of funds directly under its control so that in any protracted dispute
with the attorney-in-fact, the committee will be able to retain its
own attorneys and pay for litigation costs without relying upon
funds under the control of an adversarial attorney-in-fact. Another
safeguard is found in the committee’s right to immediate posses-
sion of the reciprocal’s property.  Minimally, the reciprocal should
insist that the attorney-in-fact maintain duplicate records that may
be turned over to the committee upon demand.
CONCLUSION
Subscribers, the committee and the attorney-in-fact of the re-
ciprocal are in a relationship in which disagreements can be ex-
pected, particularly between the committee and the attorney-in-
fact.  To the extent possible, potential conflicts between the attor-
ney-in-fact and the committee should be addressed in the manage-
ment agreement or subscriber agreement.  State statutes that do
not provide for an advisory committee place too much reliance
upon the fidelity of the attorney-in-fact.  Other statutes, including
those based on the Reciprocal Act, do not strike a proper balance
between the reciprocal and the attorney-in-fact, and are impracti-
cal in certain respects, particularly on the issue of termination.
Such statutes fail to recognize that although the committee over-
sees the attorney-in-fact, the attorney-in-fact has control over assets
and records of the reciprocal, and therefore has the potential to
thwart the advisory committee’s exercise of oversight functions.
Therefore, counsel for both the committee and the attorney-in-fact
should draft carefully worded management agreements to address
issues well in advance of the appointment of the attorney-in-fact.
